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Abstract
In this contribution, the notion of Big Data is discussed in relation to the monetisation of personal data. 
The claim of some proponents, as well as adversaries, that Big Data implies that ‘n = all’, meaning that 
we no longer need to rely on samples because we have all the data, is scrutinised and found to be both 
overly optimistic and unnecessarily pessimistic. A set of epistemological and ethical issues is presented, 
focusing on the implications of Big Data for our perception, cognition, fairness, privacy and due process. 
The article then looks into the idea of user-centric personal data management to investigate to what 
extent it provides solutions for some of the problems triggered by the Big Data conundrum. Special 
attention is paid to the core principle of data protection legislation, namely purpose binding. Finally, 
this contribution seeks to inquire into the influence of Big Data politics on self, mind and society, and 
asks how we can prevent ourselves from becoming slaves to Big Data.
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Resumen
En este trabajo se debate la noción de macrodatos con relación a la monetización de los datos personales. 
Se revisa lo que afirman algunos de sus defensores y adversarios, según los cuales los macrodatos implican 
que «n = todos», en el sentido de que ya no es necesario utilizar muestras, puesto que disponemos de 
todos los datos, y se llega a la conclusión de que tal argumento es al mismo tiempo demasiado optimista 
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e innecesariamente pesimista. Se presenta una serie de aspectos epistemológicos y éticos relacionados 
con las repercusiones de los macrodatos en nuestra percepción, cognición, imparcialidad y privacidad así 
como en los debidos procesos legales. A continuación, el artículo examina la idea de la gestión de datos 
personales centrada en el usuario, para averiguar hasta qué punto este tipo de gestión aporta soluciones 
a algunos de los problemas planteados por el enigma de los macrodatos. Se presta una especial atención 
al principio básico de la legislación sobre protección de datos, concretamente el principio de finalidad 
vinculante. Para terminar, este trabajo pretende indagar en la influencia que tiene la política de los 
macrodatos en la persona, la mente y la sociedad, y preguntarnos cómo podemos evitar el convertirnos 
en esclavos de los macrodatos.
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macrodatos, inteligencia artificial, monetización de los datos personales, gestión de datos personales 
centrada en el usuario, doble contingencia
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Introduction
The problem with Big Data is that n = all.1 Or rather, 
the problem is the claim by some of its advocates (and 
adversaries) that n = all. ‘N = all’ nicely summarises what Big 
Data is about, how it is defined and which are its pitfalls. If it 
were true, Big Data could rupture any membrane that shields 
our inner lives, disrupting the most sacred place of both 
privacy and autonomy, because it would allow its masters 
to know us better – and to know anything better – than we 
do ourselves. If it were untrue, Big Data could still uproot 
our sense of self and our interface with the world, because 
to the extent that we could not contest its outcomes, we 
would have trouble resisting the seemingly clean, objective 
knowledge it produces and we would not have the tools to 
determine how we are being profiled. If untrue, Big Data 
will generate incorrect discrimination, but even if true Big 
Data can generate unfair or unjustifiable discrimination. 
The problem is, of course, that speaking in terms of true or 
untrue in relation to Big Data does not make sense, because 
Big Data is about data modelling. Whether top-down or 
bottom-up, automated or even autonomic, it is better to ask 
whether the modeling works, what its effects are and how 
these effects are distributed. Finally, and most importantly, 
the question is what kind of humans will we become when 
interacting with the models that Big Data generates to figure 
us out with. I have already succumbed to speaking of Big Data 
as ‘something’ that figures us out. As if Big Data has a mind 
of its own. It would be so simple to deny this and attribute 
its predictions to the designers of Big Data technologies 
or to their users, the advertising networks, data brokers, 
justice authorities, scientists, smart grid operators and any 
other service providers that base their decisions to grant 
a credit, a job or insurance on Big Data. Or to the service 
providers that outsource their decisions to the high-speed, 
real-time autonomic computing systems that increasingly 
determine our external environment. Take for example the 
preparations for the Smart Grid that will combine real-time 
processing of our energy usage data with flexible pricing 
to enable us to upload energy to the grid and sell it to our 
nearest neighbours.2 IBM has coined the term autonomic 
computing, suggesting that autonomous computing systems 
will adapt our external environment just as the autonomic 
nervous system ‘runs’ our internal environment: in ways 
to which we have no conscious access, and over which we 
have no direct control.3 To the extent that Big Data is smart 
enough to operate autonomically, however, it must outsmart 
 1.  In quantitative empirical research, ‘n’ stands for the sample, whereas ‘all’ would refer to the entire population. If ‘n’ were ‘all’, we would 
no longer be referring to a sample because we would be researching all the instances of whatever it is we want to investigate. 
 2.  Hildebrandt (2013a).
 3.  Kephart et al. (2003, pp. 41–50). 
IDP Issue 17 (October, 2013) I ISSN 1699-8154 Journal promoted by the Law and Political Science Department
Eloi PuigEloi PuigJ se R. Agustina
www.uoc.edu/idp
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
29
Slaves to Big Data. Or Are We?
Mir ille Hildebr ndt
 4.  Kohavi et al. (2007); Chopra (2010). See also eg.: <http://elem.com/~btilly/effective-ab-testing/>.
 5.  Mayer-Schönberger et al. (2013, p. 6). 
 6.  Fayyad et al. (1996, p. 41).
both its designers and its users. Big Data is smart because it 
generates solutions we could not have developed, since as 
humans we do not have enough computing power. So, the 
use of Big Data generates unpredictability similar to that of 
an animal: however well trained, we cannot entirely control 
its behaviour. Worse still, it may generate the volatility of 
volcano eruptions – of ‘acts of god’ as we once called them. It 
might be that, to the extent that we worship Big Data, believe 
in it and make ourselves dependent upon its oracles, it turns 
into a new pantheon, filled with novel gods – gods of our own 
making, but not necessarily under our control. This indicates 
that it may indeed be wise to speak of Big Data having a 
mind of its own, without suggesting that its mind is like 
our mind, and without forgetting that its mind is developed 
initially by businesses, scientists and government agencies 
to make a profit, to construct new knowledge and to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. 
In this contribution, I want to raise the question of the double 
contingency – the mutual interdependence – between Big Data, 
individual minds and human society. To do so, I will begin by 
(I) investigating how Big Data has been defined, including the 
provocations this has generated from those at home in the 
field of data science. I will then look into some of the solutions 
being offered (II), for instance by the World Economic Forum, 
to re-establish some form of balance between individual 
persons and the corporations who practically own the data 
relating to them. I will then also discuss one of the core 
principles of constitutional government: purpose binding 
(III) – firmly rooted in the principle of legality (not to be 
confused with legalism). In the realm of personal data 
processing, this principle relates not only to Big Data in the 
hold of data-driven governments, but also to the business 
models of private companies that monetise Big Data. To 
what extent is the sharing, selling and further processing 
of personal data beyond the context of its collection lawful 
and/or ethical? Is Big Data analytics compatible with prior 
purpose specification? Or is function creep the holy grail of 
Big Data, and is cross-contextual data mining what makes 
for the added value in science, business and administration? 
Must we rethink purpose specification as it is entirely at 
odds with the internal logic of Big Data? I will conclude (IV) 
by returning to the question of the mutual interdependence 
of Big Data, individual persons and human society.
1. Defining Big Data: ‘N = All’
If you want to improve the performance of your website, you 
can do AB research.4 This means you make a small change 
to the layout of your site A and direct half of your visitors 
to site A and the other half to site B, which is the same site 
but with minor changes. You then log everything the visitors 
do and calculate how the two versions of the site match for 
preferred behaviour (say, purchasing behaviour). Instead 
of taking a sample of your website visitors and calling 
them or sending them an email, you simply measure the 
behaviours of your visitors and act on the findings. You no 
longer depend on the subset that responds, and there is no 
bias from people who provide you with politically correct 
answers. You do not have to settle for what people say they 
did or will do – you can just calculate what they did, do and 
will probably do. We, those visitors, are your guinea pigs, 
though nobody asked for our consent to engage in this 
experiment, nobody paid for our contribution to improve 
the performance of the website and, in fact, we never even 
noticed we were doing so. 
The Big Data Conundrum:  
implications of a game changer 
In their breathtaking Big Data. A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live, Work and Think, Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier describe Big Data as referring to:
things one can do on a large scale that cannot be done on a 
smaller scale.5
This is an important starting point, because obviously 
Big Data is not merely about a big bag of data. The 
complementary dimension, which is part and parcel of 
the notion of Big Data, is constituted by the techniques to 
mine relevant patterns from stored or even streaming data. 
These techniques have been named knowledge discovery 
in databases (KDD) and most of them are now associated 
with machine learning. KDD has been defined as:
[T]he nontrivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially 
useful and ultimately understandable patterns in data.6
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Machine learning has been defined as:
A machine learns with respect to a particular task T, 
performance metric P, and type of experience E, if the system 
reliably performs its performance P at task T, following 
experience E.7 
Both form the core of Artificial Intelligence: A Modern 
Approach (AIMA),8 not to be confused with Good Old 
Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI). The latter was based 
on deductive models, rule-based or case-based, assuming 
that intelligence could be modelled and replicated based on 
a formal model of human intelligence. The modern approach, 
notably machine learning, is based on the notion of agency, 
defined as the capability to be interactive, autonomous and 
adaptive.9 I know that many authors still have doubts about 
machines that learn, but I think it is more productive to 
admit that machines are indeed learning, at high speed, 
and in a manner both different and similar to how we 
learn. This does not imply that machines think like we do, 
or feel as we may. It does raise the question of whether 
our own learning processes are beginning to change as a 
consequence of having to interact with learning machines. 
What does autocomplete do to our way of writing? How 
does it impact our fluency in language? Which productive 
misunderstandings does autocomplete generate between 
communicating friends? Remember that Zizek wrote that 
communication is a successful misunderstanding,10 meaning 
that we can never really look into each other’s minds, we 
can never be sure whether we mean the same thing with 
the same words. He reminds us that this is not a problem to 
be solved, but a source of creativity. Is autocomplete, which 
nicely forebodes other types of smart environments, like 
ambient intelligence and the Internet of Things,11 a source 
of creativity, or does it aim for perfection and will it in the 
end take over the production of meaning, though from the 
perspective of a machine? Will we internalise the drive for 
disambiguation that is inherent in machine language and 
will we come to believe that disambiguity equals perfect 
communication? In other words, the question is not 
whether machines can ‘really’ learn, but whether we will 
become more like machines because that will make it easier 
to anticipate how they anticipate us? And if so, is there 
something important in human learning, human thought 
and human feeling that we want to preserve? 
Let us, however, first follow Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
in their quest to explain Big Data. Their analysis starts 
with the notion of ‘n = all’. In traditional quantitative 
research, scientists that aim to uncover regularities in a 
population were forced to investigate a sample, relying on 
statistics to extrapolate from the sample to the population. 
Examining the whole population was simply impossible or 
too costly. A population can be a set of people, but also a 
set of animals, plants, stones, landscapes, cells, molecules 
or any other entity, event or process. So, the research 
starts with a hypothesis that is tested on the sample. The 
sample consists of ‘n’ instances of the relevant population, 
suggesting that, to the extent that the sample correctly 
represents the population, the findings on the sample will 
hold for the population. Such traditional research requires 
developing the hypothesis, composing a representative 
sample, conducting the research and calculating the 
conclusions, which take time, expertise in the relevant 
subject matter and – depending on the kind of testing to be 
done – may also require expensive instruments. Whatever 
the conclusions, they remain uncertain due to the fact that 
it is not possible to collect all the relevant instances of the 
population. 
‘N = all’ means that the sample equals the population. It 
implies that the uncertainty generated by the jump from 
sample to population is absent in the case of Big Data. Or, 
more moderately formulated, it means that the exponential 
increase in ‘n’ substantially reduces this uncertainty. This 
is linked to the idea that the availability of nearly all 
instances of a given population compensates for potential 
inaccuracies. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier indeed claim 
that lack of precision in some instances will be corrected 
by subsequent recordings of further data. The growth of 
knowledge that is made possible by having ‘n = all’ invites 
further ‘datafication’, promising endless opportunities to 
mine the data in search of new relevant patterns. This is 
the case because such patterns may enable new business 
models, or – in the case of public administration – new 
business cases for more efficient and effective governance. 
 7.  Mitchell (2006).
 8.  Russell et al. (2010).
 9.  Floridi et al. (2004, pp. 349–379). 
 10.  Zizek (1991, p. 30).
 11.  Van Den Berg (2010); Aarts et al. (2003).
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We can say that ‘datafication’ is the process of translating 
the flux of life into discrete, machine-readable, measurable 
and manipulable bits and bytes.12 Datafication reinforces the 
illusion of ‘n = all’, because it enables seemingly unlimited 
discretisation due to the reduction of costs of and the 
exponential increase in computing power. 
The current explosion of data actually does two things. 
First, it turns data into noise: the sheer quantity of bits and 
bytes makes them unreadable to the human eye. Second, 
to turn this noise into information or even knowledge, 
computational techniques of information retrieval have been 
developed and applied. And as indicated earlier, this is not 
merely about queries that retrieve the original input, but 
increasingly about mining operations that retrieve patterns 
not previously uncovered – invisible patterns derived from 
statistical inferencing. Such inferences can be termed 
‘data derivatives’ as Louise Amoore aptly suggests.13 Data 
derivatives that provide for present futures, or in other 
words, anticipations of the future present. And, as Elena 
Esposito has argued,14 these present futures will shape the 
future present. The better the predictions (the present 
futures), the more people may act on it and thus change 
the cause and the course of the future present. 
In the meantime, as Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier note, 
the speed with which new data become available and the 
speed with which correlations within the data sets can be 
mined AND tested, seems to suck the life out of the quest 
for causality. This is rapidly becoming an old-school quest, a 
search for ‘why’ in an era that works better on ‘how, when, 
where, depending on what’, with no time to sort out the 
causes ‘behind’ the correlations. Because by the time you 
have started your investigation, the correlations may have 
been falsified, shown to be spurious or simply followed up 
with novel correlations that ‘work’ better. This point has 
been made many times, notably by Chris Anderson in his 
provocative article in Wired Magazine “The End of Theory”.15 
Indeed, the shift from causation to correlation is based on 
a consequentialist understanding of meaning; to explain 
the meaning of a correlation one does not revert back to 
causation but one looks forward to what it might effect. 
From the perspective of philosophical pragmatism, this is 
fascinating: it reminds one of the so-called pragmatist maxim 
on the meaning of concepts. This maxim seems particularly 
‘apt’ for the era of Big Data if we replace conception with 
correlation or pattern:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.16
The next big thing that Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
discuss is the shift from expertise to data analysis. There 
seems to be no field in which data analysis is not emerging as 
a game changer, realigning work processes, methodologies, 
business models and business cases. The exposure of 
the secret surveillance practices of the NSA by a system 
administrator are a case in point17. To survive, both the 
industry and government must adapt their decision systems 
in line with data processing operations that progressively 
dictate what is possible, thus enabling as well as limiting 
how we perceive the world. This then raises the question 
of free will. Mayer-Schönberger et al. suggest that we are 
on the verge of data dictatorship, meaning that we become 
incapable of perceiving reality outside the mediation of 
Big Data techniques and technologies. The authors thus 
propose that data, data mining, machine-to-machine 
communication and computational decision systems may 
soon take over. 
N is not All and All is not N
It seems that Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier start with 
somewhat unwarranted techno-optimism and finish with 
similarly unwarranted techno-pessimism. I will now briefly 
discuss the six provocations developed by Boyd and 
 12.  Manipulation is used here in the neutral sense of altering, editing or moving text or data on a computer in a skilful manner. The ability to 
manipulate bits and bytes may result in the capability to manipulate a person in the pejorative sense of controlling or influencing a person 
or a situation cleverly, unfairly or unscrupulously.
 13.  Amoore (2011, pp. 24–43).
  14.  Elena Esposito (2011). 
 15.  Anderson (2008). Still earlier philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers traced the way correlations operate in the era of data mining: 
actually producing meaning instead of uncovering previously existing causes or reasons, eg. Stengers (1997, pp. 62-63).
 16.  Peirce (1958).
 17.  Davidson (2013). 
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Crawford18 against the Big Data conundrum. First of all, 
Boyd et al. agree that automated research changes our 
definition of knowledge. Big Data is not just another addition 
to knowledge generation or knowledge management. It is 
a game changer. It implies another understanding of what 
counts as knowledge and creates different underpinnings for 
human, machine-to-machine and hybrid decision systems. 
Contrary, however, to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, they 
do not believe in ‘n = all’. Claims to objectivity and precision 
are misleading. I would suggest that this is related to the fact 
that quantification always implies a preceding qualification. 
To translate the flux of life into discrete, machine-readable 
bits and bytes, we must qualify what counts as the same 
type of data, what realities fit what objects and attributes 
in the data models used to map Big Data. This entails 
interpretation. As has been noted,19 there is no such thing 
as ‘raw data’ – data are made, just like facts. As the French 
say: ‘les faits sont faits’. In that sense, N is never All, because 
the flux of life can be translated into machine-readable data 
in a number of ways and whichever way is chosen has a 
major impact on the outcome of data mining operations.
In line with this, Boyd and Crawford claim that Bigger Data 
is not always Better Data nor necessarily Whole Data; 
sometimes Small Data is Best Data. Now, here we have a truly 
revolutionary statement, as far as the Big Data conundrum 
goes. I believe that for data scientists this is nothing new or 
surprising. Time, human expertise and computer power are 
scarce – contrary to what some Big Data believers like to 
announce. The translation of entities, events and processes 
into discrete data requires the interpretation of such entities, 
events and processes and requires reiterant anticipation 
of what a specific data model will effect, and how it will 
enable and restrict the outcome of data mining operations. 
This relates to Boyd and Crawford distinction of social 
networks between humans of flesh and blood, on the one 
hand, and behavioural networks or social graphs observed 
by the software machines of service providers, on the other. 
Mistaking machine-readable behaviours for action seems 
part of the business case for predictive analytics. Though 
this may be a very productive ‘mistake’, it might in fact 
trigger a situation where behaviours draw the curtain on 
action: who cares whether you had reasons or intentions 
if your behaviours correlate with your genetic disposition, 
match your online social graphs or the combined data 
collected by government agencies in the course of your 
life? Boyd et al. thus set the stage for two ethical issues. 
1.  Does the fact that personal data are publicly available 
render their exploitation and monetisation ethical? 
2.  Should we accept the novel inequalities created by the 
knowledge asymmetries between data subjects and data 
controllers? 
  We can add four epistemological issues that incorporate 
a number of less obvious but far more pervasive ethical 
issues:
3.  Traditional natural and social sciences start from 
theoretical reflection that is tested by deriving a 
hypothesis that can be checked against a sample (this 
is called falsification and is supposed to create robust 
knowledge). What does it mean to skip the theory and to 
limit oneself to generating and testing hypotheses against 
‘a’ population?
4.  Data science provides for a number of alternative 
techniques to detect patterns in data sets, which will 
often have alternative outcomes. If public and private 
service providers mostly employ only a subset of such 
techniques, what does this mean for the robustness of 
such outcomes and for the extent to which they should 
inform the architecture of autonomic computing systems?
5.  In the old days we said ‘if men define a situation as real, 
it is real in its consequences’ (Thomas Theorem).20 Now 
we must admit ‘if machines define a situation as real, it 
is real in its consequences’. What does this mean for the 
salience and the bias of the decision systems that depend 
on Big Data analytics?
6.  If the intestines of these decision systems are opaque to 
those affected by their operations, and even to those who 
operate them, where does this leave democracy and the 
Rule of Law? Are due process and fair administration, 
informed consumer choice and the right not to be subject 
 18.  Boyd et al. (2012).
 19.  Gitelman (2013).
 20.  Cf. Merton (1948, pp. 193–210). 
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to invisible decision-making on the verge of becoming 
illusive concepts?
2.  Personal data management  
in the era of Big Data
Volunteered, Observed and Inferred data
Let us return to the AB experiment. The data are mined to 
improve the user experience, the website’s performance, 
or the profitability of the business model, but they are not 
volunteered by the visitor. No forms are filled, no questions 
asked. The data here are observed data, and they usually 
consist of behavioural data. In its project on Rethinking 
Personal Data, the World Economic Forum (2013) recently 
launched a report entitled Unlocking the Value of Personal 
Data: From Collection to Usage.21 One of the key aspects 
of their supposedly new approach includes ‘new ways to 
engage the individual, help them understand and provide 
them with the tools to make real choices based on clear 
value exchange’. This is very interesting. For a long time, 
the value of personal data has been seen as related to an 
individual’s personality. German legal doctrine, for instance, 
understands the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection as personality rights, meaning that they are 
related to the dignity and autonomy of a person and should 
be seen as constitutive for the self;22 not as something to 
trade with. In the realm of consumer-business relations 
as well as iGovernment, the legal framework of EU data 
protection is focused on data minimisation. As consumers 
or as citizens, people should only provide the data that are 
necessary for a specific purpose and their usage is only 
lawful as long as this purpose (or a compatible purpose) 
holds. This also holds when the data are provided with 
consent.23 However, once we begin to think in terms of ‘a 
clear value exchange’ and speak of personal data as ‘a new 
asset class’, the monetary value of personal data is indeed 
unlocked. In a previous report, the WEF actually highlights 
this point by stressing the hidden potential of personal data 
as ‘untapped opportunities for socioeconomic growth’,24 
urging a renewed discussion of the collection and usage of 
such data that takes into account the current monetisation 
of personal data. This renewed discussion starts from an 
alternative typology of data, clearly distinguishing between 
volunteered, observed and inferred data, rather than 
between personal and non-personal data. Traditional data 
protection legislation still seems focused on volunteered 
data, even in the case of third-party access to personal 
data or in the case of legal obligations to provide data. 
Volunteered data are defined as ‘created and explicitly 
shared by individuals, eg. social network profiles’. I would 
add that all the forms you fill and credit card data you 
consciously provide are volunteered data. Note that the 
distinction between volunteered and observed data is not 
about whether a person has provided consent or even 
about whether they should be considered personal data. 
The processing of both types of data may involve or even 
require consent and they may both be qualified as either 
personal or non-personal data, e.g. depending on the use 
of anonymisation techniques. The business case for AB 
research, traffic management, NSA spying programs, law 
enforcement or fraud detection is seldom restricted to 
the processing of volunteered data. It is more often based 
on observed data, usually behavioural data, measured by 
the software machineries that mine, share and sell such 
observed data to attain the holy grail of Big Data, which 
is inferred data. So, we have volunteered, observed and 
inferred data and I dare say that these different types of 
personal or ‘unpersonal’ data require differential legal 
protection.25 It is one thing to consent to the sharing of 
credit card data in order to buy something online, or to 
the sharing of a photograph posted on Facebook, and an 
altogether other thing to consent to machine-to-machine 
sharing of your online behaviours, or to the sharing of your 
public transport behaviours or your biometric behaviours. 
Moreover, the inferred data, e.g. profiles derived from 
data mining anonymised aggregated data, may have the 
biggest impact on a person. If three or four data points 
of a specific person match inferred data (a profile), which 
need not be personal data and thus fall outside the scope 
of data protection legislation, she may not get the job she 
 21. World Economic Forum (2013).
 22.  Rouvroy et al. (2009); G. Hornung et al. (2009, pp. 84–88).
 23.  De Hert et al. (2006). 
 24. World Economic Forum (2011).
 25  Unpersonal data is neither personal nor non-personal in the sense that the distinction is not relevant. Anonymised and inferred data may 
be non-personal data as far as art. 2(x) Directive 95/46 EC is concerned, but when applied to an individual person its impact may be more 
substantial than the use of volunteered data.
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wants, her insurance premium may go up, law enforcement 
may decide to start checking her email or she may not gain 
access to the education of her choosing. 
Under the EU data protection framework, however, there is a 
right not to be subjected to such profiling to the extent that 
it is fully automated.26 There are three major exceptions to 
that right: consent, contract and a legal obligation. If such an 
exception applies, there is a transparency right: we must be 
told that profiling has determined the decision and we must 
get information on how different factors were weighted. 
To become an effective right, those who employ the data 
analytics that significantly impact a person should provide 
transparency of the backend system (what the software 
is actually doing) in a clear and comprehensible manner. 
And, since end-users should not be entirely dependent on 
those who ‘own’ the data servers and machine learning 
technologies, they will require their own transparency tools, 
i.e. on the frontend of the system. Such transparency tools 
can be created as platforms run by consumers or trusted 
third parties that allow consumer data to be shared and 
mined to predict how the data will probably be monetised 
or how they might be used by law enforcement. Such 
platforms would employ inference engines to counter-profile 
the profilers or, in other words, to guess how we are being 
anticipated, to read how we are probably read and to pre-
empt how our intentions might be pre-empted.27 
User-centric Personal Data Management
This brings us to the solutions currently proposed. After 
the failure of large-scale employment of privacy-enhancing 
tools (PETs), followed by the notion of Privacy by Design 
(PbD), which has been taken up as a legal obligation in 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
under the heading of Data Protection by Design (DPbD), the 
new kid on the block is called Personal Data Management 
(PDM).28 This can best be understood as an attempt to build 
architectures and trust frameworks that should enable 
data minimisation and informed consent, with the hope of 
bringing end-users back into the equation of personal data 
ecosystems. I will not go into the technicalities but refer to 
the definition of Bus et al. (2013) of context-aware PDM as 
an ICT application that: 
enables an individual to control the access and use of her 
personal data in a way that gives her sufficient autonomy to 
determine, maintain and develop her identity as an individual, 
which includes presenting aspects (attributes) of her identity 
dependent on the context of the transactions (communication, 
data sharing, etc.), and enabling consideration of constraints 
relevant to personal preferences, cultural, social and legal 
norms.29
There are many vague terms here, but sometimes being more 
specific means reducing protection. Defining notions such 
as ‘identity’, ‘sufficient’, ‘context’, and ‘consideration’ will be 
necessary, but every further definition will also reduce the 
applicability of the concept – so we better leave such further 
definition to the operational level.30 It is important to note 
that the term ‘identity’ is used here in two different ways. 
First as a reference to the self and second in the technical 
sense of the complete set of attributes that defines a person, 
or in the technical sense of one or more data points that 
uniquely identify a person. The idea behind PDM is that the 
use of technical identities has an impact on the development 
of identity in the sense of selfhood, meaning that the use of 
identities in the technical self should be restricted to protect 
identity construction in the sense of selfhood.31 One way of 
achieving protection against ‘unreasonable constraints on 
the construction of one’s identity’,32 would be to employ 
PDM as an instrument for minimal disclosure, for instance 
by enabling authentication by means of attribute-based 
credentials instead of full identification. By only revealing 
the attribute that is necessary for the provision of a service 
(being under or over a certain age, male or female, having 
 26.  Art. 15 of 12 D 95/46 EC and art. 20 of the proposed GDPR. On the differences see Hildebrandt (2012, pp. 41–56).
 27.  On the pre-emption of our intentions as a function of behavioural advertising, McStay (2011, p. 3).
 28.  Obviously many commercial entities and government agencies are literally managing other people’s personal data. When I refer to PDM, I 
mean user-centred PDM, providing a measure of control to the person to whom the data relate. This may or may not include transparency 
about what profiles a person’s data points match, even if these data points do not count as personal data (because they are merely 
attributes, not easily linkable to a unique identifier). 
 29.  Bus et al. (2013). 
 30.  Which will allow people to contest a restrictive interpretation.
 31.  Hildebrandt (2008). 
 32.  Agre et al. (2001, p. 7).
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or not having a certain diploma, having enough credit), 
unnecessary dissemination of personal data is prevented. 
One of the drawbacks of this way of proceeding is that people 
can then be profiled on the basis of their attributes; though 
they may be anonymous they may still be targeted, since Big 
Data allows inferences from the usage of such attributes. 
Another drawback may be that service providers will need 
proof that the claimed attribute is indeed a ‘true’ attribute 
of that person, requiring a link with a root identity that is a 
real or true identity. Especially in situations where no such 
link is currently required, this could increase constraints 
on identity construction based on personalised profiling.
Monetising one’s personal data
Some forms of PDM actually strive to enable the 
monetisation of personal data by the data subject herself. 
This is interesting because it simply acknowledges that 
personal and other data are currently monetised, and 
accepts that this has consequences for those to whom the 
data relate or to whom data derivatives are applied.33 Instead 
of struggling against monetisation, it embraces the idea 
that this might create added value, but it also demands 
that those whose data are used as a resource get a share 
of the profits (Novotny et al., 2013). We could apply Rawls’ 
maximin principle here:34 whoever manages to create added 
value is entitled to a bigger share of the cake, as long as the 
least advantaged do not see their share diminished. This 
is a way to achieve distributive justice. It is based on the 
idea that if we all share the same cake, distribution should 
in principle be equal, whereas anybody who enlarges the 
cake may claim a slightly bigger share in order to incentivise 
such an enlargement. The side constraint with the maximin 
principle is that this may never disadvantage those with the 
smallest shares and basically requires they be better off too 
(or at least retain their original share). So, PDM should not 
create asymmetries that make us – citizens, consumers – 
worse off in terms of our share of the monetary value than 
before the advent of Big Data analytics. This would entail 
engaging us in the monetisation and allowing us to gain 
part of the profit. It also sustains the incentive to invent 
applications for Big Data analytics because whoever creates 
added value gets a good share of the profits. 
Obviously there are other types of reasons to engage 
citizens and consumers in the creation of added value: it 
should enhance our autonomy, allow us to figure out how we 
can influence autonomic decision systems and compensate 
for the knowledge asymmetries that would otherwise 
subsist. In short, it should reinstate the system of checks 
and balances that is constitutive for the Rule of Law, thus 
in a way reinventing the Rule of Law in the era of Big Data 
– and not merely in relation to the government, but also in 
relation to other big players that may be more powerful 
than a government. However, there are also major concerns 
with PDM systems that allow data subjects to monetise their 
personal data. The main question is to what extent PDM 
may simply be co-opted by the industry and government 
agencies to further monetise our data, precisely by 
involving our initiative.35 For instance, what happens if we 
can foresee what behaviours will increase the monetary 
value of our behavioural, observed data? What comes 
from the awareness that we can make money by matching 
those inferred profiles that turn us into profitable entities? 
When shall we start reading specific content just because it 
enables monetisation, instead of reading content that is of no 
interest to the data brokers, advertising networks and viral 
marketeers of the Big Data era? Are we going to be influenced 
by the automated micro-payments that will accompany 
our machine-readable behaviours? Will this turn us – the 
observed clusters of data points – into slaves of Big Data? 
3.  Purpose binding in the era  
of Big Data
Before answering the question of Big Data slavery, I will 
investigate one of the core principles of data protection 
legislation that is under extreme pressure to give way to 
a more lenient approach to data usage. This concerns the 
principle of purpose binding, which entails two interconnected 
rules: (1) the processing of personal data is only allowed for 
explicit and specific purposes and (2) further processing is 
not allowed if the purpose no longer applies, unless another 
purpose that is not incompatible with the original purpose 
applies.36 Purpose binding is deeply entwined with the 
notion of minimal disclosure or data minimisation: once the 
 33. Hildebrandt et al. (2013).
 34. Rawls (2005). 
 35.  Thus applying a kind of self-censure on our own behaviours, cf. Hutton et al. (1988). 
 36.  Art. 6b, c, d, e of D 95/46/EC and art. 5b, c, d, e and 6(4) of the proposed GDPR.
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purpose no longer holds, processing becomes unlawful even 
if there was consent. Under current legislation, in the EU a 
person cannot waive her right to compliance with purpose 
limitation, because whatever ground applies (art. 7 DPD) 
all the conditions of lawful processing apply (art. 6 DPD). In 
the case of consent (one of the grounds of art. 7), purpose 
limitation applies (art. 7.a). My questions in this contribution 
are, how does this principle relate to the ‘n = all’ of Big Data, 
and how does it relate to the PDM-type of solutions? More 
specifically, how does purpose binding relate to contextual 
integrity, Helen Nissenbaum’s salient proposal to rethink 
privacy and data protection in an era where the opposition 
between the private and the public spheres is way too coarse 
to do the work?37
Purpose binding and ‘n = all’
To the extent that Big Data enables to ‘do on a large scale 
what cannot be done on a smaller scale’, purpose binding 
seems at odds with the business case for Big Data. Big Data 
wants n, nothing less. Data minimisation, e.g. enabled by 
attribute-based credentials (ABC) technologies, means that 
you reduce the data points that are provided (volunteered 
or observed data) to those necessary for the purpose of 
processing. For instance, instead of giving your ID to prove 
your age when buying alcohol, you just claim that you are 
over 18 and provide the necessary proof without revealing 
other data points (e.g. your precise age, male or female, 
etc.). Data minimisation also means that instead of allowing 
third parties to track your clickstream behaviours across 
different websites, you eg. only allow the websites you 
visit to observe behaviours necessary for the technical 
and functional operations of the website. The purpose of 
the processing of observed data is then limited to what is 
necessary for a smooth user experience within the domain 
of your attention. However, what if observed data are mined 
to serve the legitimate interest of the advertising network 
that is tracing and tracking you? What if the explicit and 
specific purpose of Google Adwords is to create added value 
for both the advertiser and the website that offers space 
to auction ads based on behavioural advertising? What if 
governmental departments decide to reuse data on the 
basis of a new legal obligation, thus sparing citizens the 
boring task of providing the same data time and again? 
Can data collected for billing of energy usage be used for 
fraud detection if the fraud concerns social security? Can 
a legal obligation for smart grid operators to provide data 
for purposes of law enforcement overrule the principle of 
purpose binding? The ‘n = all’ of fraud detection implies a 
business case for having ever more data points on citizens, 
correlating e.g. energy usage, mobility, location and telecom 
traffic data to fraudulent behaviours. What was the logic of 
art. 6(4) of an earlier version of the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation that stipulates that:
Where the purpose of further processing is not compatible 
with the one for which the personal data have been collected, 
the processing must have a legal basis at least in one of the 
grounds referred to in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 1. This 
shall in particular apply to any change of terms and general 
conditions of a contract. 
Would this mean that, contrary to current law, one could 
consent to reuse data for an incompatible purpose? Or could 
governments create new ‘legal obligations’ to reuse personal 
data, or claim that reuse is necessary and proportional ‘to 
perform a task carried out in the public interest’? Would 
this have been this a good way to render data protection 
compatible with the possibilities to create added value 
in the Big Data era? Art. 29 WP opined this erodes both 
data minimisation and purpose binding, because consent 
means so little in times of cognitive overload, and new legal 
obligations should not automatically justify reuse.38 On the 
other hand, if Big Data is of interest because it generates 
patterns we could not have foreseen and thus enables 
usage that could not be predicted, then purpose binding is 
presumptuous and starts from the wrong premise. We do 
not know in advance what use is made possible, and to find 
out we must first mine the data, and to figure out which data 
are relevant we must mine as much data as possible (‘n = 
all’). The value of Big Data can only be set free if we admit 
the novelty of the inferred knowledge and rethink purpose 
binding in line with the innovative potential of its outcomes.39 
If PDM is the solution, what was the problem?
Let us investigate this by checking whether PDM can be 
combined with purpose binding. PDM means that a person 
 37.  Nissenbaum (2010). 
 38.  Art. 29 WP Opinion 03/2013, WP203 on the principle of purpose binding, at 38.
 39.  Massiello et al. (2010, pp. 119–124).
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has adequate access to and control over where, when and 
how her own data are being processed. And perhaps also 
for what purpose, though that is not obvious. If PDM merely 
allows to grant access and to have information on what 
entity is using the data, this does not help with enabling 
purpose limitation. To achieve such a thing would require 
the privacy policy, the terms of service or the user license 
agreement to be checked in advance and to trust that the 
data controller will stick to it. Alternatively, it would require 
ensuring that the data travel around with a backpack of 
metadata that determine their legitimate usage, including 
the terms of their deletion (e.g. self-executing whenever 
certain conditions apply). Preferably this backpack should 
enable some form of machine-to-machine reporting on 
what is going on, while PDM could for instance have 
a control panel or dashboard that enables targeted 
destruction of individual data streams if usage is found 
to be unlawful or – in the case of processing on the basis 
of consent – if usage is no longer desirable (withdrawal 
of consent). 
However, if we look at the incentive structure of Big Data 
analytics, we are again confronted with the notion of ‘n = 
all’. PDM may be used to facilitate the mining of as much 
personal data as possible. Notably, if PDM is designed 
in a way that gives you a share in the monetisation of 
your data points, your PDM dashboard may become a 
play station that generates real income. You can learn to 
switch data streams to generate the largest profits and 
you can manage your data in a way that provides you with 
free access to most of the services. Or can you? Maybe 
you can manipulate the data streams – of your observed, 
behavioural data – such that they match profitable profiles. 
You can learn to game the system. And, of course, some 
will try to hack your data streams to gain illegal access 
to your profits. But switching data streams and changing 
behavioural data patterns probably implies changing 
your behaviours. Do we really want to tune our machine-
readable behaviours to engines of commercial exploitation 
– and is it really us who will be doing the exploitation 
once PDM systems are in place? Or will those who offer us 
money be nudging us into compliant behaviours (compliant 
with whatever those willing to pay for our data have in 
mind for us). Will anything we do be measured, stored and 
mined to make us more nudgeable, more compliant and 
more foreseeable?
What problem, then, does PDM solve? Does it allow us the 
illusion of being in charge of our own data points, thus 
inviting us to collaborate in our own subversion? Are we in 
the last stages of becoming a composite of commodified 
and commodifiable data points, a cognitive resource 
for the intelligent computing systems that manage our 
external environments, critical infrastructures, income 
redistribution systems (called taxation), and of the upcoming 
infrastructure of distributed 3D printing? Is the knowledge 
asymmetry between the end users, on the one hand, and the 
companies, the engineers and the designers of distributed 
interconnected personal data processing systems, on the 
other hand, not already so extensive that the sheer idea of 
regaining control betrays a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the extent to which we are already under control (their 
control)? For now, I propose that we do not get carried away 
by techno-pessimism, though I will return to this point in 
the last part of this contribution.
Purpose binding and contextual integrity
Before that, I will briefly investigate the link between 
purpose binding and contextual integrity. Both concern 
the idea that legitimate expectations about the sharing 
of data partly depend on the role of the data controller 
(is it your doctor, the NSA or Facebook?), the purpose 
of processing (is it improving your health, preventing 
terrorist attacks or increasing shareholder value?) and the 
context (are we talking about medical advice, safety and 
security, or commerce?). The difference is that purpose 
binding requires prior articulation of specific, explicit and 
legitimate purposes that bind and thus restrict the further 
processing of personal data. Contextual integrity seems 
more vague, on the one hand, not necessarily requiring 
prior determination of explicit and specific goals, and more 
precise, on the other hand, making legitimate processing 
dependent on the legitimate expectations that go with a 
specific context, independent of explicit articulations of 
specific purposes. Another difference is that the purpose 
limitation principle is applicable to individual personal data, 
whereas contextual integrity applies to data flows. The first 
is a legal obligation that applies to data processing within EU 
jurisdictions; the second is an ethical principle, developed 
within the US by an ethical scholar, Helen Nissenbaum40 
and incorporated in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
declared by the Obama administration (without binding 
 40.  Nissenbaum (2010).
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force, however, and obviously not meant to be applicable 
to the NSA).41 Contextual integrity is especially relevant in 
the US because of the so-called third-party doctrine that 
holds that once data have been provided to another party 
they are considered public and can be shared by that other 
party with e.g. law enforcement, unless stipulated otherwise 
in the relevant contract, privacy policy or statute. Purpose 
binding may rely too much on the old idea that it is possible 
and sensible to decide on the purpose of data processing 
beforehand, whereas the added value of Big Data partly 
resides in the potential to uncover new purposes that may 
create a win-win situation. Contextual integrity, however, 
could restrict database fusion, prohibiting the usage of data 
in a context that is not consistent with the context in which 
it was collected. Just like in the case of purpose binding, this 
raises the issue of the added value of unexpected findings 
in cross-contextual data mining; findings that may generate 
new medical cures, better prediction of terrorist intention, 
or more diverse consumer choice? 
Purpose binding, as well as contextual integrity, challenges 
the business case for Big Data. Can we have our cake and 
eat it too? To figure this out, we need to analyse the dangers 
of re-use of the same data for a different purpose, e.g. after 
consent or based on a legal competence, as well as the 
dangers of cross-contextual data mining. These dangers can 
be summed up as those of a surveillance society, where the 
surveillance may be done by the government but also by 
commercial enterprise and the biggest threats come from 
where the two sit down to exchange their data. Both the NSA 
tapping into the metadata of large Internet companies, and 
science and commerce nourishing on Open Data, increase 
the ‘n = all’ conundrum and allow for the use of refined data 
derivatives to achieve frightful illusions of omniscience. In 
the next section, I will return to what is actually the problem 
with this ‘n = all’ type of illusionary omniscience. Here I 
would claim that: no, we cannot always have our cake and 
eat it too. Sometimes we can; sometimes we cannot. It all 
depends. But if we cannot, we must invent ways to prevent 
ourselves from being lured into sharing our data points 
in exchange for instant satisfaction or immediate rewards. 
Though behavioural economics is somewhat shallow in its 
analysis of interaction, it confirms the old myth of Odysseus 
and the Cyrens. Since we seem to have a preference for 
immediate satisfaction over and above later rewards, we 
need to build protection into our environments, helping to 
keep us on course. Requiring prior determination of the 
purpose of processing may be one way to prevent overly 
enthusiastic data harvesting, and as a legal stipulation it 
may have more force than an ethical principle to stick to 
context. 
Now, let us return to the question of who we might become 
as individuals and as a society with increasing dependence 
on Big Data infrastructures. This should help us to assess 
whether prior purpose specification and use limitation are 
necessary conditions for developing the kind of personhood 
and the kind of community we want.
4.  Endings: who are we in the era  
of Big Data?
Auto-complete: nudging people into compliance?
This reintroduces the question of the impact of Big Data 
analytics on our mind, self and society. Morozov has nicely 
summarised the drawbacks of the imagined omniscience 
(‘n = all’), combined with the solutionist mindset of Silicon 
Valley’s geeks. In his latest book he reminds us that:
[i]mperfection, ambiguity, opacity, disorder, and the opportunity 
to err, to sin, to do the wrong thing: all of these are constitutive 
of human freedom, and any concentrated attempt to root them 
out will root out that freedom as well.42
Legal philosopher Roger Brownsword actually argued 
similarly with regard to techno-legal solutionism:43 if 
technologies enable us to enforce compliance, we are no 
longer in the realm of law. To qualify as law, we need the 
right to disobey the law, to challenge its validity in view of 
higher legal norms and to contest its application in particular 
instances. The checks and balances of the Rule of Law and 
the division of tasks between legislator, administration and 
the courts imply that law appeals to reason and is not set 
in stone. Whenever technologies enforce compliance, we 
are in the realm of administration or discipline. If Big Data 
allows a persistent subliminal pre-emption of our intent, if 
it autocompletes our environments on the basis of inferred 
 41.  See: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights>. 
 42.  Morozov (2013, p. xiv).
 43.  Brownsword (2005, pp. 1–22). 
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preferences and enables the kind of calculated nudging 
that will turn us all into law-abiding, friendly, healthy and 
productive fellows, we should shrink back and reconsider. 
So, we should not be fooled by techno-optimists who may 
have their own reasons to nudge us into auto-completion. 
But neither should we be overly impressed by techno-
pessimists who announce the end of times. Though it is 
correct to observe that at the moment we are fair game 
for smart environments that entice us to turn ourselves 
inside-out while becoming addicted to the latest app, it is 
also correct to observe that we learn. Just like machines 
that run the code of the latest form of artificial intelligence, 
we learn. The question is what we stand to learn here. As 
indicated above, the bottom line is that we must invent 
ways to anticipate how smart environments anticipate us, 
to guess how we are being read, to figure out what current 
futures are inferred and how they will influence our future 
currency. Because whereas machines can develop many 
present futures (predictions of our future behaviours), there 
will be only one future present. To come to terms with smart, 
data-driven environments we must learn how to outsmart 
them, to stay one step ahead of them while they try to 
stay one step ahead of us. This may sound exhausting, but 
it need not be. On the contrary, it is where we come from 
and what we cherish in human society: the reiteration of a 
mutual double anticipation.
A double contingency of Human-Machine 
Interaction? 
Sociologists have called this the ‘double contingency’ of 
human interaction.44 It is what constitutes both human 
society and individual selves. It is what makes for uncertainty 
about whether we mean the same thing when referring to 
the same word, pressing us for techniques and technologies 
that stabilise meaning despite its inherent instability. Double 
contingency means that I need to anticipate how you will 
understand me to be able to make sense. Mead called this 
‘taking the role of the other’, imagining how another sees 
us; thus being born as a person and developing a sense 
of self.45 When I tell a young child: ‘you are Sally’ while 
pointing to her, and ‘I am Mireille’ while pointing to myself, 
the child will repeat: ‘you Sally’ while pointing to herself, and 
‘I Mireille’ while pointing to me. I will correct her, but she 
will be surprised, repeating both the gesture and the name. 
The moment that Sally understands that to me she is ‘you’, 
while to herself she is ‘I’, she is born again, capable of taking 
the perspective of another to herself. She is now capable 
of reinventing herself, predicting herself, reflecting on her 
self, provoking expectations of her self and, ultimately, 
being provocative by violating those expectations. This is 
where both our sense of humour and our sense of human 
freedom emerge. Such freedom cannot be reduced to 
consumer choice or to freedom from external constraints, 
it is tied up with the ability to re-view oneself and change 
course, based on how we foresee that our actions will 
be interpreted. And all this is made possible by taking 
the perspective of another. This is why Ricoeur spoke of 
Oneself as another.46 This is also why Zizek remarked that 
‘communication is a successful misunderstanding’;47 not just 
any misunderstanding, but one that succeeds. In what? In 
nourishing the productive ambiguity of human language, 
allowing us to act in concert despite recurrent shifts in 
meaning. In generating new meaning from the interstices of 
unintended misunderstandings, thus opening the floodgates 
for new ways of seeing the same things, which thus become 
other things, allowing us to play around with the implications 
of our actions, re-viewing them with new eyes – those of 
other others. 
What happens (1) if it is now machines that anticipate us, 
and what happens (2) if we begin to anticipate how these 
profiling machines anticipate us? It seems that to ‘come 
into one’s own’ in a smart environment we have to take the 
perspective of the inference machines. While the machines 
are trying to figure us out, we will try to game the system 
and decide for ourselves whether we are indeed the type 
of person they have calculated. If PDM enables us to guess 
the value of our personal data, the double contingency may 
be reinstated. We might then develop the technologically 
mediated capacity to guess how we are predicted and learn 
how to pre-empt the pre-emption of our intentions. That 
sounds good. There are, however, three caveats here:
The first relates to the question of what happens if machines 
anticipate us. We should admit that they can only take into 
 44.  Vanderstraeten (1995).
 45.  George Herbert Mead et al. (1962).
 46.  Ricoeur (1992).
 47.  Zizek (1991), above nt. 10.
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account machine-readable data, and their inferences are 
contingent on a population consisting of machine-readable 
data. N, therefore, cannot be All, because not everything can 
be discretised. Datafication is both a multiplication of reality, 
a virtualisation in the sense of Deleuze,48 and a reduction of 
reality, because it necessarily translates the flux of life into 
discrete data points. This is the same for written language, 
by the way. But written language is visible for those who 
learned to read and write, whereas computer language is 
the secret knowledge of the experts.
The second relates to the question of what happens to us if 
we begin to anticipate these machines. Shall we, in figuring 
out how machines ‘think’, become more like machines and 
lose some of the ambiguity inherent in the usage of spoken 
and written language? Is Brian Christian right that instead 
of machines becoming more like humans, we are becoming 
more like machines?49 Is Maryanne Wolf right that the 
morphology and the behaviour of our brains will change 
and that we must ask what must be preserved, highlighting 
that we cannot take for granted that our brains will adapt 
without losing what was developed in the course of our 
evolution as reading animals?50 
The third relates to the transparency that reinstates the 
double contingency. The PDM model, described earlier, may 
enable intuitive transparency by means of monetisation. 
The introduction of a tertium comparationis in the form of 
money – of a price – could empower us to foresee how our 
data points match inferred behavioural models. But, as we 
have seen above, this may create perverse incentives. The 
question is, however, whether we have alternatives. 
Currently, the transparency that is provided whenever prior 
informed consent is required creates a ‘buffer overflow’: 
the amount of information it involves floods our bounded 
rationality and this enables manipulation by what escapes our 
attention. Though some would applaud the Enlightenment 
of Descartes’ idées claires et distinctes, others may point 
out that they generate overexposure, wrongly suggesting 
the possibility of light without shadows. The metaphor of 
the buffer overflow actually suggests that we may require 
selective enlightenment, and that we are in dire need of 
shadows. The more interesting question, therefore, will 
be what should be in the limelight and where do we need 
darkness. In Renaissance painting, the techniques of the 
claire-obscure, the chiaroscuro, the Helldunkel were invented 
and applied to suggest depth, and to illuminate what was 
meant to stand out. By playing with light and shadow, the 
painting could draw the attention of the onlooker, creating 
the peculiar experience of being drawn into the painting 
– as if one is standing in the dark, attracted by the light. 
Big Data analytics invites us to reinvent something like a 
claire-obscure, a measure of transparency that enables us 
to foresee what we are ‘in for’. This should enable us to 
contest how we are being clustered, correlated, framed and 
read, thus providing the prerequisites for due process. This 
should, finally, enable us to play around with our digital 
shadows, acquiring the level of fluency that we have learned 
to achieve in language and writing.51
I end this contribution with a reference to the enigma of 
the Sphinx on the cover of a book I recently co-edited 
with Katja de Vries. It depicts Oedipus in the clearing of 
a clair-obscure. He stands out strong, wilful and looks 
somewhat impatient. The Sphinx stands in the shadow 
of a cave, potentially irritated that a trespasser has 
finally solved her riddle. However, though Oedipus may 
have solved the riddle, he cannot evade the fundamental 
fragility it foretells. Though monetisation of personal 
data points may help to reinvent a new version of the 
double contingency that constitutes our world, it cannot 
resolve the fundamental uncertainty that it sustains. In 
fact we need transparency tools that help to reinstate 
this uncertainty, rather than the over-determination that 
monetisation might otherwise enable.
 48.  Deleuze (1994); Lévy (1998).
 49.  Christian (2011). 
 50.  Wolf (2008). 
 51. This and the next paragraph - literally - draw on Hildebrandt (2013b, pp. 238-9 and 241).
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